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RECENT CASES
Communication-Granting of F. M. Broadcast Licenses by Federal Communications Commission-The Commission granted construction permits to build F. M. stations to five out of eleven applicants.
Two successful applicants were standard broadcast stations; one, because
it was a key network station, the other, because it had a history of meritorious service. The other three were: a labor union, a religious organization and a group of local business men. Of the six unsuccessful applicants, two failed to file exceptions. An A. M. station was rejected for
over-commercialization, another applicant, for lack of technical qualifications. Two applicants, newspapers, were rejected in the interests of
diversity in the ownership of the media of mass communication and to
insure competition in the dissemination of news. The successful applicants were chosen because the commission believed diversity of ownership
would better serve the public interest, especially since these groups were
well qualified to give adequate treatment to the social, economic, and
religious issues of the community. In Re W B N X BroadcastingCo., Inc.
16 U. S. L. WEEK 2221 (F. C. C. October 21, 1947).
The standards laid down by the Communications Act of 19341 for
the granting of licenses look only to the qualifications of the applicant. It
is the Commission itself which is concerned with the qualifications of the
applicant's program. 2 Radio history shows that many years were spent
by the commission creating order out of chaos in the job of allocating
frequencies to thousands of applicants, while working under the engineering obstacles of the wave spectrum, amplitude modulation and radio interference. s When this was done and the tri-partite classification 4 of clear
channel, regional and local stations was established, the commission discovered that the "curse of bigness" had spread over radio. Clear channel
stations originally designed to provide reception for the farm areas had
fallen into control of the coastal chains who were piping in anything ex-

1. 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §307 (1935), as amended 49 STAT. 1475
(1936), 47 U. S. C. § 307(b) (Supp. 1939) ; see Penstone, Meaning of the Term "Public Interest, Convenience, or Necessity" Under the Communications Act of 1934, as
Applied to Applications for Licenses to Construct New Broadcasting Stations, 9 GEO.
WAS H. L. REv. 873 (1941).

2. For an excellent discussion of the Commission's attempts to work out a standard of program services which must be met by prospective licensees, see Warner, The
Administrative Process of the F. C. C., 19 So. CALIF. L. REv. 191 (1945).
3. Id. at 198. "The wave spectrum now known to radio . . . ranges from ten
kilocycles to over a million kilocycles per second. . . . Because of the many demands
for radio communication, the Commission has designated that portion of the spectrum,
that is from 550 Kc. to 1500 Kc., as the standard broadcast band. . . . A ten Kc.
separation between stations represented a compromise with the ideal of absolute fidelity in order to obtain a maximum number of channels. . . . Hence the number of
communicating channels are 96. . . . A receiving set cannot select between two adjacent channels without some degree of overlap and hence some interference will result
between them. This degree of selection is made generally unnecessary in practice,
however, by assigning adjacent channels to stations in widely separated areas of the
country. . . . Such frequency assignments impose a definite limitation upon the
number of channels which can be made available in one area. This procedure requires
the simultaneous use of channels by stations widely separated."
4. Id. at 204. Clear channel stations are high power stations with large signal
radii that reach into rural areas. Regional stations have medium power; they cover
metropolitan districts and their suburbs. Local stations serve small communities.
(563)
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the formulation of the "Blue Book" 15 and the expression of a new
policy 16 which for some time had been heralded by the language of the
Network 17 cases. The sterile requirements of the Act and the tonguein-cheek promises of applicants, have forced a policy of "radio for public
service." The F. C. C. has relegated the role of advertising to the
secondary position of supplying this public service, keeping in mind that
as to program content, the equity of the listener is greater than the equity
of the station owner or the sponsor. The Commission's decision to favor
two non-profit groups out of a total of five awarded licenses, shows that
it has a greater faith in the promises of these groups than in those of
commercial broadcasters to provide the nation with a high standard of
service. The nature of F. M., from an engineering standpoint, promises
wider coverage on a more local basis. (It does not suffer the frequency
limitations of A. M. It is peculiarly suited to local broadcasting, but
Future decisions to license service
can be networked if necessary.)
groups of a non-profit nature may enable Radio to become a more adult
facet of American life and may secure the widest circulation of contending ideas and entertainment, free from advertising abuse and private interest.

Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-Racial Segregation
in Violation of the Interstate Commerce Act-Pursuant to railway
regulations,' complainant, a negro, was refused dining car service on
defendant's train as the section tentatively reserved for colored persons
was occupied by white passengers, although vacancies then appeared in
the section reserved exclusively for white persons. Complainant was
given the choice of immediate service in his Pullman space or of waiting until the section for colored persons was completely vacated by the
current occupants. The Commission, holding that this practice failed to
afford substantial equality of treatment to colored passengers in violation
of the Interstate Commerce Act,2 ordered defendant to desist therefrom on
15. See note 11 supra.
16. Id. at 55. "In issuing and in renewing the licenses of broadcast stations, the
commission proposes to give particular consideration to four program service factors
relevant to the public interest. These are: (1) the carrying of sustaining programs
including network sustaining programs, with particular reference to the retention by
licensee of a proper discretion and responsibility for maintaining a well-balanced program structure; (2) the carrying of local live programs; (3) the carrying of programs devoted to the discussion of public issues, and (4) the elimination of advertising
excesses."
17. National Broadcasting Co., et aL v. United States (F. C. C.), 319 U. S. 190,
215 (1943). The Commission has "the burden of determining the composition of the
traffic." (Italics ours.)
1. The regulations in question provided that a section be reserved exclusively for
white passengers and that a section be reserved for colored passengers, but that if no
colored person appeared for service within thirty minutes after the diner opened and
if the space was needed to seat white passengers, it could be so used, and that if a
colored person thereafter appeared, he would have to wait until the section was completely vacated by the current occupants. These rules were changed before the hearing
began, and a section was reserved exclusively for colored persons on the line involved.
[Brief for defendant, pp. 2, 3.]
2. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 3(1) (1940). "Undue Preferences or prejudices prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any common carrier . . . to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preferences or advantages to any particular person
. or to subject any particular person . . . to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
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the line in question, but denied monetary damages. Luther P. Jackson v.
Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., I. C. C. Dkt. No. 29660 (1947).
Racial segregation on carriers has been enforced continually in southern
states by statute or carrier regulation. Legislative assaults on the practice were declared unconstitutional.3 Actions by individuals alleging that
such segregation was an unconstitutional deprivation of civil rights have
failed to override the pleas that state legislatures, under the police power,
and that interstate carriers, in the absence of legislation by Congress, had
the right reasonably to regulate the conduct of carriers so long as there

was equality of treatment of both races. 4 On the issue of civil rights, the
CCseparate but equal accommodation" formula has remained the constitutional standard. 5 In the face of such unfavorable precedents later complaints of discriminatory segregation under state laws disregarded the
question of civil rights and emphasized the technical objection, bottomed
on precedent, 6 that such laws constituted unlawful regulation of interstate commerce. Originally courts evaded the task of balancing state
police power against the federal commerce power by accepting the states'
construction that only intra-state commerce was thereby affected 7 and
that congressional inaction implied assent to such regulation." However,
courts have recently placed greater stress than mere lip service on the
requirement of equality of treatment,9 and in Morgan v. Virginia, a Virginia statute, construed to apply to interstate commerce, was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce.' 0

3. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883) (declaring unconstitutional the Federal
Civil Rights Act which gave all races equal rights to public accommodations). The
powerful dissent of Harlan, J., has remained the spearhead of attempts to have racial
segregation declared unconstitutional under the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments. See THE REPORT OF THE PREsIDENT's COmmITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 105,
(1947).
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1877) (declaring unconstitutional a Louisiana
statute requiring interstate carriers to carry negroes in the same cabin with whites,
as an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce). Today, however, state laws prohibiting racial segregation in places of public accommodation are in effect in eighteen
northern states. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 394 (1946).
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) (Upholding state law requiring
segregation as a reasonable exercise of police power and not in contravention to the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments).
Chiles v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 218 U. S. 71 (1910) (Upholding as constitutional
a railway regulation requiring equal but separate accommodations for the different
races). See Mitchell v. U. S., 313 U. S. 80, 94 (1941). A similar attitude has prevailed where states have separate institutions for the education of different races.
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927).
5. Mitchell v. U. S., 313 U. S. 80 (1941) ; Henderson v. U. S., 63 F. Supp. 906
(D. Md. 1945). For a general criticism of the "separate but equal" provisions, see
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CiviL. RIGHTS 80, 81 (1947).

6. See note 3, 2, supra.
7. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388 (1900); Louisville, N. 0. &
T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587 (1890).
8. Chiles v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 218 U. S. 71 (1910).
9. Mitchell v. U. S., 313 U. S. 80 (1941) ; Henderson v. U. S., 63 F. Supp. 906
(D. Md. 1945) ; Georgia Edwards v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 12 I. C. C. 247 (1907).
A similar trend is discernible in the field of education. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
10. 328 U. S. 373 (1946). The complete effect of this decision is not yet clear.
Many segregation laws are expressly restricted to apply only to intra-state passengers.
[See statutes and cases cited in Comment, 46 COL. L. REv. 855, n. 15 (1946).] Although a carrier engages in interstate commerce, such laws have been applied to intrastate operations. South Covington & C. St. Ry. v. Kentucky (3 Justices dissenting),
252 U. S. 399 (1920) ; Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587 (1890).
The Supreme Court, however, could easily overrule these precedents on the ground
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The instant case, while indicating the trend toward greater protection
of rights of minority groups on carriers, contributes only in a very small
way toward abolishing "undue prejudice," the injunction being limited
to that part of defendant's line on which complainant travelled."
Since
the Commission does not find ground for granting damages in these
2
cases,' no deterrent is imposed against similar violations on the unaffected
parts of the railway. Such negative piecemeal relief is manifestly ineffective against widely practiced segregation on interstate carriers. In
the light of the inadequacy of the Commission's orders, and of recent
liberal decisions, it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will declare
carrier segregation on the basis of color unconstitutional under the fifth or
fourteenth amendment, 13 or, which seems more likely, extend the doctrine of Morgan v. Virginia to all carriers which in any way affect or become part of interstate commerce. 14 Finally, there lies in the wake of such
legal developments the formidable problem of enforcement, 15 which problem must be worked out before effective termination of racial segregation
can be hoped for.

Constitutional Law-Validity of Act Delegating Tax Power to
Local Governments-Pursuant to legislation permitting political subdivisions to tax any subject taxable but not taxed (or licensed) by the
state,' elected school directors imposed a tax on coal mined within their
district. Taking original jurisdiction over plaintiff coal company's bill
to restrain the levy, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
statute, being neither an improper delegation of the tax power, nor a viothat, regardless of the asserted scope of the statute, they do in fact affect and burden
the inseparable links in interstate commerce. See South Covington & C. St. Ry. v.
Kentucky, supra at 408.
Since the states are fairly evenly divided into groups requiring, prohibiting, and
not regulating racial segregation on carriers, the validity of the Morgan decision on
the ground of need for uniformity in interstate commerce was properly questioned
by dissenting Justice Burton. The argument advanced by the majority might as well
have been applied to outlaw statutes prohibiting racial segregation on interstate carriers. See note 3, 12, supra.
11. See Record, Sheet No. 5.
12. The Commission has continuously declared that it lacks jurisdiction to impose
exemplary damages, and that no damages are recoverable where complainant only suffered embarrassment as a result of the injury. See Record, Sheet No. 5.
13. The question of civil rights may come up in a suit either under the existent law
which disfavors the theory that civil rights under the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments are violated by segregation, or under new civil rights laws which
the President's Committee on Civil Rights has recommended. See THE REPORT OF
THE PRESIENT'S CoMMITEE ON

CivL

RIGHTS

105, 166, 170 (1947).

14. See note 10 supra. Although the validity of the Court's reasoning is not certain, the decision is law, recently declared, and perhaps the court will be more disposed to this method of furthering the policy of protecting civil rights, under the
commerce clause, than the direct but more difficult course of overruling the line of
cases on the import of the civil rights amendments which was begun in 1877.
15. For a harsh, but accurate, indication of the difficulty of enforcing a law hostile
to the custom and sentiment of a large part of the community, see Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U. S.537, 551 (1896).
1. Act of June 25, 1947, Act No. 481, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, §§ 2015.1 to 2015.8
(Purdon, Supp. 1947). Section 1 includes cities of the second class, second class A
and third class; boroughs, towns, and townships of the first class; and school districts
of the second, third and fourth classes. Certain subjects of taxation are excepted.
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lation of the requirement that taxes must be uniform,2 is constitutional.
English v. School District of Robinson Township, 358 Pa. 45, 55 A. 2d

803 (1947).
By extending settled rules, the court has permitted a delegation of
the tax power 3 which, in the case of political subdivisions other than
cities, is broader than any previous delegation. A limited power dearly
may be conferred upon school boards 4 composed of elected directors. 5
Heretofore, however, the statutes have confined directors to setting, up

to specified maximums, the mill-rates of property taxes. 6

Thus no

precedent completely supports the present grant of power, which enables
directors to determine the subject of taxation and the amount to be col8
lected from each subject.7 Under Blauner's, Inc. v. Philadelphia,
the
legislature may, of course, delegate such liberal powers to cities. But
cities alone are included in the constitutional provision for home-rule 9
upon which that decision was primarily based. Hence the court has
now, in effect (as to the tax power), written "other political subdivisions"
into the home-rule clause. In so doing, it has correctly refused to distinguish such subdivisions from cities, for even school districts fall within
the reasoning by which delegation has been upheld: that subdivisions
tax as representative bodies,' 0 or as "agents" of the state." Because of
this reasoning, any distinction between previous powers and powers .as to
the subject (a distinction necessary to a contrary decision) would be
highly artificial.
The statute itself was born of urgent necessity. Experience indicates
that localities can no longer rely upon the real property tax, historically
their principal source of revenue.' 2 Declining assessment values and
2. "All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. . . ." PA.CONsT. Art. IX, § 1. The
article is satisfied by uniformity within the taxing subdivision. Moore v. Pittsburgh
School District, 338 Pa. 466, 13 A. 2d 29 (1940) ; accord, Clouser v. Reading City,
270 Pa. 92, 113 AUt. 188 (1921).
3. The power is not inherent in local governments. Hillman Coal Co. v. Jenner
Township, 300 Pa. 108, 150 Atl. 293 (1930). But it has long been settled that it may
be conferred upon them. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
4. Delegation in fact to school directors was first held constitutional as being not
a "delegation," but the creation of an agency. Minsinger v. Rau, 236 Pa. 327, 84 Atl.
902 (1912). In earlier cases, the constitutional issue was not raised. E. g., Wharton
v. The School Directors, 42 Pa. 358 (1862).
5. Legislation purporting to delegate the tax power to a merely appointive board
is invalid if it allows the board to set the maximum rate itself. Wilson v. Philadelphia
School District, 328 Pa. 225, 195 At. 90 (1937), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 212. But at
least where the legislature fixes the maximum rate and subject of taxation, such delegation is permitted. Minsinger v. Rau, supra note 4.
6. E. g., Act of May 18, 1911, P. L. 309, PA. STAT. ANN., tit.
24, § 592 (Purdon,
1930). Under this statute, directors may go so far as to set the maximum rate if
another statute specifies the purpose for which the rate is increased. Duff v. Perry
Township School District, 281 Pa. 87, 126 Atl. 202 (1924).
7. Section 1 provides that the amount of taxes raised by ordinances pursuant to
the act shall not exceed the figure resulting from multiplication of the assessed real
estate valuation by the maximum millage allowed by law. PA. STAT. ANN., tit.
53,
§ 2015.1 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
8. 330 Pa. 342, 198 Atl. 889 (1938). In this case the court upheld a statute (provisions as to the subject identical with those of instant statute) delegating, to cities
of the first class, tax powers unlimited even with respect to amount.
9. PA. CONsT. Art. XV, § 1.
10. Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. 491 (1869).
11. See note 4 supra.
12. See Murdoch, The State Commission as an Administrative Agency, Appendix
B, PA. B. A. Q., No. 26, p. 361 (1936).
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substantial delinquencies have reduced that revenue, 13 while taxpayers
have opposed increases in rates. 14 That tax, furthermore, has become
objectionable as an imposition of oppressive burdens upon realty, and
as an exception to the concept of "ability to pay." 1r When rising prices
aggravated these difficulties, the legislature chose to make new subjects
of taxation accessible to political subdivisions. Delegation of discretion
as to the subject is the best means to this end, for it permits subdivisions
to adjust their tax systems to local conditions. But the present delegation
is unduly broad. Subject to the criticisms usually directed at localization, 16 it has a harmful effect upon state efforts to attract industries, and
allows discrimination against any local subjects which appear vulnerable
to taxation, e. g., coal.' 7 It is true that abuses can be checked by amendment, and that the indicated disadvantages are restricted by the wide area
of taxation pre-empted by the state. Would it not be desirable, however,
to minimize these disadvantages by legislation defining the subjects of
taxation among which subdivisions may choose? 18 It is fortunate that
the court has not only protected localities from the temporary financial
crisis which might have followed destruction of the statute, but has raised
no constitutional bar to improved legislation along this line.

Equity-Effect of Prior Violation of Sherman Act as Establishing Unclean Hands to Bar Action Under Trading-with-the-EnemyAct-Criminal and civil proceedings under the Sherman Antitrust
Act 1 had been brought against Standard Oil Co. in March, 1942. Standard
pleaded nolo contendere to the criminal information and consented to an
entry of a decree in the civil case 2 terminating the cartel arrangement
between it and I. G. Farben. Thereafter the Alien Property Custodian
took title to certain patents and stocks involved in the cartel dealings. An
13. See

cIAL

PHILADELPHIA ADVISORY FINANCE COMMISSION, FINANCES AND FINANADMINISTRATION OF PHILADELPHIA 24, 31 (1938).

14. Efforts to raise the real property tax rate have even led to widespread constitutional and statutory limitations of municipal indebtedness and of the tax rate itself.
See Stason, The Fifteen Mill Tax Amendment and Its Effect, 31 MIcH. L. REv. 371
(1932).
15. For several criticisms of the tax, see TAX POLICy LEAGUE SYMPOSIUM, PROPERTY TAXES

(1940); see also, Pennsylvania Bar Association, Report of Committee

on Taxation, PA. B. A. Q., No. 24, pp. 91, 94 (1935).
16. Localization of the tax power, while advantageous as a balance to centralization, and as a stimulant to popular participation in government, may create, in the case
of taxes levied pursuant to the instant statute, multiple taxation by overlapping subdivisions, and may injure businesses whose competitors in neighboring districts are
taxed at a lower rate or not at all. These objections may be made to any local tax,
as may be made the objections of high cost and low personnel standards. See Murdoch, Real Property Taxation in Pennsylvania, 11 PA. B. A. Q. 126 (1940).
17. The resolution imposing the instant tax upon coal at a fixed rate per ton
would, under the reasoning of a prior case, be invalid as taxing property without respect to value. Commonwealth ex rel. v. Overholt & Co., 331 Pa. 182, 200 Atl. 849
(1938) (per-gallon whiskey tax) ; but cf. Green County Coal Tax Appeals, 302 Pa. 179,
152 At. 755 (1931), rev'd sub nora. Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision, 284
U. S. 23 (1931) (coal lands assessment). This point, not discussed in the instant
opinion, was argued by counsel. Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 70.
18. For such a treatment, see LAws OF N. Y. 1947, c. 278, § 1, effective March 22,
1947.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§1-40 (1940).
2. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), Civil Action No. 2091 (D.
N. J. March 25, 1942), 10 U. S. L. WEEK 2640 (Mar. 31, 1942).
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action to recover this property was, in part, successful,3 and, on appeal,
the court rejected the over-all defense that Standard was barred as a suitor
in this equitable action 4 because of prior unclean hands in the acquisition
of the property. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), et al., v. Clark, '44-'47
CCH TRADE REG. SERV. ff 57,616 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).

The equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" is usually held to apply
only to cases where the unconscionable conduct of the plaintiff is directly
connected with the subject matter of the suit.5 Until recently this limitation was given a narrow construction, and statutory violations, including
illegal restraints of trade, were rarely successful as defenses when invoked
in an attempt to show that plaintiff's hands were unclean. 6 In the patent
infringement field the preservation of the narrow limitations on the equitable
doctrine worked a particular hardship on the public.1 Finally, in Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,s it was held that the plaintiff's practice in
using a patent to control unpatented material was so opposed to public
policy as to bar it from equity's protection against an infringer, adding, as
dictum, that it was unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff had violated
the Anti-trust Acts.9 This case would seem to make the field of "public
policy" available as a source of the "clean hands" defense. In the principal case the court was clearly being asked to extend even further the
application of the liberal doctrine of the Morton Salt Co. case.' 0
Conceding that the operation and philosophy of cartels is inconsistent
with the general policy favoring free enterprise 11 and that cartel arrangements of this type 2 cause great difficulty for the Alien Property Cus3. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), et al. v. Markham, Alien Property Custodian,
64 F. Supp. 656 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) (the decree returned to Standard the property
acquired before the October, 1939, agreement but failed to return the remainder).
4. Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 STAT. 419 (1917), as amended, 50 U. S. C.
App., § 9(a) (1940) : "Any person not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest, right, or title in any money or other property which may have been conveyed,
transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian or seized by
him . . . may institute a suit in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia or in the district court of the United States for the district in which such
claimant resides . . . to establish the interest, right, title, or debt so claimed ...
"
5. E. g., Carpenter's Union v. Citizen's Committee, 333 Ill. 225, 164 N. E. 393
(1928) (wrong not directly connected with matter in suit); 2 PoMERoy, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 94 (5th ed. 1941).
6. See 50 YALE L. J. 1114 (1941).
7. Berge, Antitrust Enforcement in the War and Postwar Period,12 GEo. WASH.
L. Rsv.371, 393 (1944) : ". . . many abuses of the patent system . . . have adversely affected the free play of normal competitive impulses. These abuses shout for
curbs. . ...

8. 314 U. S. 488 (1942), 42 COL. L. Rav. 882, 40 MIcH. L. Rv. 1266, 51 YALE L.
J. 1012.
9. The court's reservation of the discretion to determine what is public interest
is analogous to the position taken in the protection of trade-marks, trade-names, and
copyrights where they are used as a means of misrepresentation or deception. Worden
v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U. S. 516 (1903).
10. A determination of the "clean hands" problem was necessary before resolving
the controlling issue of whether Standard had brought itself within the definition of
"foreign national" by its dealings for I. G. Farbenindustrie.
11. See Kronstein, The Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents, 9 U. oF CnI. L.
REv. 643 (1942) ; Berge, supra note 7.
12. Berman, Cartels and Enemy Property, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoD. 109, 111
(1945) : "Cartel relations make it likely that after the war American companies will
return patent rights conveyed even without a formal commitment to do so, or will
make some sort of compensating arrangement. For example, as part of the Jasco adjustment referred to above, Standard and I. G. Farben entered into an arrangement
(intended to be morally binding but not legally enforceable) to exchange regular reports of the financial returns and to correct any financial inequity, as judged by their
original agreement, resulting from the rearrangement."
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todian, it is submitted that neither policy nor the Morton Salt Co. case
would justify the request. In the principal case, to deny Standard the
right to come into court to prove its nationality might result in permanently
depriving an American national of its property. The Trading-with-theEnemy-Act is directed against enemy nationals only 13 and the policy
against a permanent deprivation of property has always been a potent
one.14 A permanent deprivation must clearly be distinguished from the
temporary denial of the right to enforce a property right allowed by the
Morton Salt Co. case. In addition, under the rule of the latter case, once
the improper practice has been abandoned, the lost property right returns
to its owner. 15 It is to be noted that Standard actually had "clean hands"
at the time of this suit. Since the reason for the rule is here absent, the
rule should not be applied. The court has wisely refused to allow an unwarranted extension of the Morton Salt Co. case, and by so doing has
added strength to a potentially useful principle by emphasizing a logical
limitation.' 6

Estates-Right to Accretion Where Life Tenant Has Power to
Consume-Husband's will created in his widow a legal life estate with
power to consume, remainder to his children. After widow's death, the
estate showed an enhancement of over $200,000 which the lower court
awarded to the remaindermen. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the life tenant being merely a debtor to the remaindermen, her heirs
are entitled to any accretions. Hays' Estate, 358 Pa. 38, 55 A. 2d 763
(1947).
Pennsylvania has consistently held the relationship of the life tenant
to the remainderman to be that of debtor and creditor,' the rationale being
that when the life tenant files security for the protection of the remainderman's interest, 2 the rights of the parties are fixed and may not thereafter
be altered. The life tenant, or his surety, is liable to the remainderman for
the amount received under the decree of distribution,3 and since the life tenant assumes the risk of any loss or depreciation, he is entitled to all gains
and accretions. 4 However, the logic of this reasoning disintegrates where,
13. See note 4 supra. The fundamental purpose of the Act is to serve as an
economic weapon of warfare. From the beginning it has been clear that Congress intended to deal justly with the owners of the property confiscated.
14. The Supreme Court's rejection of compulsory licensing in Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945) was, in effect, a recent refusal to allow a
permanent deprivation of property. See Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust Judgments Through Hartford-Empire,34 GEo. L. J. 1 (1945) ; 45 COL. L. REv.
601 (1945).
15. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 415 (1945).
16. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 743 (1947) (contract
held enforceable although in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act), criticized in advance Note, 55 YALE L. J. 820 (1946). This case indicates that the public policy as
represented by anti-trust legislation is fighting an even greater uphill battle in actions
of a legal nature. If vigorously enforced, the anti-trust laws could be the first line of
defense against the unreasonable use of industrial power.
1. Kirkpatrick's Estate, 284 Pa. 583, 131 Ati. 361 (1925) ; Reiff's Appeal, 124 Pa.
145, 16 Atd. 636 (1889) ; Gillett's Estate, 130 Pa. Super. 309, 197 Atl. 517 (1938).
2. Such security is required under § 23 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917, PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 20, § 635 (Purdon, 1930).

3. Reiff's Appeal, supra note 1, at 149.

4. Letterle's Estate, 248 Pa. 95, 93 AtI. 935 (1915).
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as here, the life tenant is granted the power to consume the principal because in such cases, no security need be posted. 5 In such cases, the life
tenant becomes a debtor upon the granting of the decree of distribution
but only to the extent of that which may remain at his death. 6 Hence
the rule cannot be justified on the grounds that the life tenant bears the
risk of depreciation. The life tenant being liable only for the unconsumed
portion, the remainderman must suffer any loss. Thus we have the
anomalous situation of a debtor who may reduce his debt by using the
funds for his own benefit. A possible solution may be found in the
Estates Act of 1947 which provides that the life tenant shall be deemed
to be a trustee. 7 Many jurisdictions have used trust language to determine
the duties of the life tenant,8 although some of them are reluctant to apply it equally to limit his rights. Under this reasoning, the life tenant
is under a fiduciary duty to act in good faith and with due regard for the
rights of the remainderman 9 but, not withstanding this quasi trust, he
is sometimes held to be entitled to any accretions.' 0 From this it can be
seen that a mere change in language will not necessarily bring about a corresponding change in result.
The proper conclusion can be reached only by determining the testator's intent as he has expressed it in his will. 11 As an aid, certain logical
rules of construction may be followed. The power to consume is not
unlimited but is properly confined to such consumption as the life tenant
desires for his own support and comfort. 1 2 Since the life tenant may not
make a gift of any such property during his life time, it should not be
presumed that the testator intended him to have the power to bequeath it.
In the absence of language to the contrary, the intent of the testator would
clearly appear to be that the life tenant has no absolute right to any enhancement but that the remainderman is entitled to whatever remains unconsumed at the death of the life tenant. The decision in Hay's Estate may
bar such an approach, but despite that decision, the proper result may
be achieved in the future by use of the trust language of the Estates Act.

Evidence-Waiver

of Physician-Patient Privilege by Personal

Representative of a Deceased Patient-A widow brought an action
for damages, as personal representative of her deceased husband, against
the sanitarium where he had been a patient, alleging negligence on the part
of the defendant in failing to prevent the deceased from committing suicide.
At a pre-trial hearing, the plaintiff offered medical testimony that her
husband was insane with suicidal tendencies when he entered the institution. Upon objection by the defendant that the proposed testimony was
5. Heppenstall's Estate, 144 Pa. 259, 23 Atl. 860 (1891).
6. Powell's Estate, 340 Pa. 404, 410, 17 A. 2d 391, 394 (1941).
7. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 301.13 (Purdon, Supp. 1947). However, security
is still required where there is no power to consume.
8. Mallett v. Hall, 129 Me. 148, 154, 150 Atl. 531, 534 (1930) ; Trafton v. Bainbridge, 126 N. J. Eq. 448, 455, 9 A. 2d 306, 310 (1939). For a complete compilation,
see 137 A. L. R. 1054.
9. Hardy v. Mayhew, 158 Cal. 95, 104, 110 Pac. 113, 117 (1910); Johnson V.
Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 460, 38 N. E. 61, 64 (1894).
10. Milner v. Brokhausen, 153 Iowa 560, 133 N. W. 1068 (1912); Gorham v.
Billings, 77 Me. 386 (1885) ; contra: Van Blarcom v. Dager, 31 N. J. Eq. 783 (1879);
Matter of Cutler, 23 Misc. 508, 52 N. Y. Supp. 842 (1898).
11. Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218, 225, 43 Atl. 131, 132 (1899).
12. Watson's Estate, 241 Pa. 271, 88 Atl. 433 (1913) ; Johnson v. Johnson, smpra
note 9.
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privileged,' the plaintiff attempted to waive the privilege. 2 In permitting
the waiver, the District Court held that such testimony did not tend to
disgrace the memory of the deceased within the meaning of § 354 of the
New York Civil Practice Act.3 Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co.,
16 U. S. L. WEEK 2254 (W. D. N. Y. Oct. 31, 1947).
This court was cognizant of previous New York decisions holding that
evidence of insanity tends to disgrace the memory of the deceased, and
therefore that the privilege may not be waived under § 354.4 In the
opinion of this court, these prior decisions are to be distinguished in that
they involved factual situations where the memory of the deceased was
untarnished before the commencement of the action, while here, by committing suicide, the deceased was a "grave public offender" in the light
of a New York Statute; r and evidence of his insanity would explain
his act, thereby clearing, at least partially, his previously besmirched
memory. As all of the pertinent facts may now be entered for the jury's
determination of whether or not the sanitarium was negligent, the rationale
of the court must be commended, but their major premise is weakened
since it has been held in New York that suicide in itself does not tend
to disgrace the memory of the deceased. 6 Furthermore, the medical profession has recognized that mental disorders 7 should be treated, not ridiculed, 8 and even in the minds of laymen, the stigma historically placed
on an insane person has largely disappeared. 9 Where, however, insanity
is caused by a venereal disease or extreme alcholism, it may be contended
that the memory of the deceased would be disgraced if such facts were
disclosed, but that contention may be countered by inquiring whether
that person is one whom the law should protect. Has he not, in the ordinary cases, forfeited his claim to an untarnished reputation? Finally,
the practical effect of the statute granting this privilege "0 must also be considered in evaluating this decision. The function of our courts to ascertain the truth has been hampered constantly by the privilege. Thus in
New York, medical evidence of a testator's mental incompetency when
he executed a will has been held to be inadmissible," and the personal
representative of the deceased has been forced to pay a promissory note
because evidence that the deceased was insane due to delirium tremens
1. A physician or nurse "shall not be allowed to disclose any information which
"
N. Y. CIvIL
he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity.
PRACTIcE AcT § 352 (Clevenger, 1947).
2. The privilege may be expressly waived by the personal representative of the
deceased, except as to "confidential communications and facts as would tend to disgrace the memory of the patient." N. Y. CiviL PAcnicE AcT § 354 (Clevenger, 1947).
For the Pennsylvania Act, see PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 328 (Purdon, 1930).
3. Ibid.
4. In re Cashman's Will, 159 Misc. 881, 289 N.ZY. Supp. 328 (Surr. Ct. 1936),
aff'd, 280 N. Y. 681, 21 N. E. 2d 193 (1939) ; Mulligan v. Sinski, 156 App. Div. 35,
140 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1913) ; aff'd, 214 N. Y. 678, 108 N. E. 1101 (1915) ; Lippe v.
Brandner, 120 App. Div. 230, 105 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1907).
no forfeiture is im.
5. "Although suicide is deemed a grave public wrong, .
posed." N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2301 (McKinney, 1944).
6. "Unless the circumstances leading to suicide are in themselves immoral or disgraceful, the mere act of self-destruction does not necessarily tend to disgrace the
memory of decedent." Bolts v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 20 N. Y. S. 2d 675 (1940).
7. "Insanity" is a social or legal term, not a medical term. NoYEs & HAYDOx,
TEXTOOK OF PSYCHIAAY 91 (3d ed. 1940).
8. NoYEs & HAYDON. op. cit. mtpra, 285-298.
9. MAY, MENTAL DISEASES: A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM 104 (1922).
10. The physician-patient privilege was unknown at common law. Rex v. Duchess
of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 573 (1776) ; see People v. Austin, 199 N. Y. 446,
451, 93 N. E. 57 (1910).
11. In re Cashman's Will, note 4 supra.
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when he made the note was inadmissible.12 The protection afforded by
the privilege should not be extended where an injustice among the living
will result, nor should the privilege be a sword and shield to suppress
useful truth.'1 It would be well for the New York Legislature to reconsider § § 352 and 354 and their effect on the administration of the law.
Although the result in the instant case is correct, it is submitted that
the New York Courts in the future should face the issue squarely, refuse to
follow the prior decisions and seize the first opportunity to declare that insanity in itself no longer tends to disgrace the memory of the deceased.

Income Taxation-Corporate Officer's Right to Refund of Tax
Paid on Bonus Subsequently Returned to Corporation-tUnder a bonus
contract a corporate officer was paid 10% of the net profits of the corporation in 1942 and he paid income tax thereon. After renegotiation,'
the corporation, in 1945, refunded to the government a portion of its
1942 profits. The officer then returned to the corporation that part of
his bonus attributable to the excessive corporate profits. In overruling
a demurrer by the government to a petition by the officer for a refund
on his 1942 income tax, the court held that the officer was entitled to recover the amount by which his tax was increased by inclusion of the sum
repaid. Gargarov. United States, 73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
The conclusion reached by the majority appears so unimpeachably
just and reasonable that it is shocking to discover that precedent requires a contrary result. 2 A taxpayer is required to include, as income
at the time of receipt, earnings received under a claim of right and without
restriction as to their disposition even though he may claim or may subsequently be adjudged not to be entitled to retain the money. 8 Where the
taxpayer has actually refunded the money at a later date, courts have exhibited little reluctance to follow the dictum 4 of the North American case
that such refund made by the taxpayer to the source of the income must
be deducted as a loss in the year it is made rather than excluded from
the gross income of the year of receipt. 5 1 This effectually prevents the
12. Mulligan v. Sinski, note 4 supra.
13. For discussions and criticisms of the privilege see 8 WIGMORE, EviDENcE
§ 2380-90 (3d ed. 1940); Chafee, Privileged Cobwmunications: Is Justice Served or
Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand, 52 YALE L. J. 607
(1943) ; Curd, Privileged Communications Betwegi the Doctor and His Patient-An
Anomaly of the Law, 44 W. VA. L. Q. 165 (1938); Note, 3 BRooxLYx L. REv. 104
(1933).
1. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Price Adjustment Board had initiated
renegotiation proceedings in 1944 pursuant to 56 STAT. 245 (1942), 50 U. S. C. App.
§ 1191 (Supp. 1946), as amended, 56 STAT. 982 (1942), 57 STAT. 348 (1943), 50 U. S.
C. App. § 1191 (Supp. 1946).
2. See Mr. Justice Whitaker's dissent, principal case at 975.
3. Derived from North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417
(1932) (property had been taken over by a receiver in a suit challenging the owner's
title; it was held that the money paid over to the owner must be included by him as
income in the year when it was paid over to him although appeals from the decree
awarding him the funds were not determined until a later year).
4. See id. at 424.
5. Comm'r v. Alamitos Land Co., 112 F. 2d 648 (C. C. A. 9th 1940), cert. denied,
311 U. S. 679 (1940) (judgment collected, repaid after reversed) ; Griffin v. Smith,
101 F. 2d 348 (C. C. A. 7th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 562 (1939) (returned in
compromise) ; National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F. 2d 93 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) (returned voluntarily).
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correcting of the prior year's return. Several theories 6 have been evolved
by lower courts to circumvent the hardships which a rigid application of
the "claim of right" doctrine would have caused, but to date these cannot
be seriously
considered as having substantially impaired the vigor of the
7
rule.
Application of the "claim of right" doctrine obviously facilitates the
administration of the taxing statute, which is based on a system of annual
taxation, by preventing subsequent corrections of returns filed in earlier
years. Whether this is sufficient justification for its preservation is, at
best, doubtful. To begin with, the application of the rule, in effect, taxes
gross rather than net income. Furthermore, it ignores the importance of
contingency in accrual accounting. And most important, it gives rise to
the danger of extreme injustice since the right to treat a refund as a loss
in a subsequent year may well be no consolation to a taxpayer whose income in the subsequent year is less than in the year during which the
disputed income was received. To the extent that the rule of the North
American case requires that even disputed earnings be taxable as received,
it may be argued that it is justified since the alternative is to make the
government wait for its taxes while the disputes over the income are
settled.8 But the rank unfairness of not allowing a corrected return and
an appropriate refund for the previous year when that income is finally
disgorged from the taxpayer makes the application of the dictum of the
North Americait case unjustifiable. A desirable result has been reached
in the instant case, but it is doubtful that it will be sufficient to prevent
the continued application of the dogmas derived from the North American
case. Statutory action should be taken. The principal case, however,
could certainly be used as the basis for giving judicial relief to at least
one class of persons who might otherwise suffer injustice by the application of the "claim of right" doctrine. Under the renegotiation procedure
a corporation which makes a refund of excessive profits may credit against
the repayment the amount by which the tax for the prior taxable year
would have been reduced if the excessive profits had never been received
as income.9 This dispensation is understandable in view of the fact that
the government is a party to the delayed renegotiation proceedings. By
analogy, the courts could uniformly allow a similar corrected return for
the prior year to all individuals whose incomes were directly proportioned
to the corporation's profit.
Income Taxation-Negotiable Note as "Payment" Under § 24(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code-On January 1, 1941, a taxpayer-corporation, using the accrual method of accounting, reporting on a calendar
year basis and at all times solvent, gave demand negotiable notes to its
6. Great Southern Life Insurance Co., 33 B. T. A. 512 (1935), aff'd on other
grounds, 89 F. 2d 54 (C. C. A. 5th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 698 (1937) (trust
fund theory) ; Comm'r v. Turney, 82 F. 2d 661 (C. C. A. 5th 1936) (apparent that
claim wholly unfounded) ; Greenwald v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 386 (Ct. Cl. 1944)
(income received under mutual mistake of fact).
7. Trust fund theory-limited: Lewis v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 543 (D. Colo.
1936). Claim wholly unfounded theory-questioned: Knight Newspapers, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 143 F. 2d 1"007 (C. C. A. 6th 1944); disapproved: National City Bank v.
Helvering, 98 F. 2d 93 (C. C. A. 2d 1938). Greenwald v. United States, 57 F. Supp.

386 (Ct. Cl. 1944), until principal case cited only by Disney, J., dissenting, Sohio Corporation v. Comm'r, 7 T. C. 435, 444 (1946).
8. See National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F. 2d 93, 96 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
9. 56 STAT. 798 (1942), 26 U. S. C. § 3806 (Supp. 1946). See Watts, Renegotia"tion and Federal Taxation, 10 LAW & CONTEMIP. PROB. 341 (1944).
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president, the controlling shareholder; as his salary for the year 1940.
The president, on a cash basis of accounting, included the face value of
the notes in his 1940 tax return. In reversing the decision of the Tax
Court, the Circuit Court held that giving a demand promissory note, on
the above facts, is "payment" within the meaning of § 24 (c) (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code, thus allowing a deduction of its president's 1940
salary in the corporation's income return. Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 U. S. L. WEEK 2245' (C. C. A. 3rd Nov. 18, 1947).
§ § 23 (a) and (b) of the Code, which allow deductions for expenses
and interest incurred by an accrual basis taxpayer during the taxable year,
have been sources of avoidance by "related taxpayers" (one natural person as two taxpaying entities, e. g., a corporation and the president-chief
shareholder in the corporation).1 Under § 23, a corporation, using the
accrual method of accounting would deduct the salary which it owed its
president. The president on a cash basis of accounting would not have
to include in his gross income the amount deducted by the corporation.
Many times, cash payment was postponed until the president had a low
income year. The result was that less than the anticipated revenue was2
received by the government, or at least, receipt of revenue was delayed.
§ 24 (c) of the Code, designed to eliminate this practice, sets up three
conditions which, if coexistent, disallow such a deduction. Where the
corporation is family held (§ 24 (c) (3)),3 and the creditor-president, in
the year the corporation incurs the expense, need not include the amount
owed to him in his gross income (§ 24 (c) (2)), 4and the corporation has
not "paid" the creditor within two and one-half months after the close of
the taxable year (§ 24 (c) (1)),5 a deduction by the corporation under
§ 23 is disallowed. "Paid," the weasel word of § 24 (c) (1), is, in the
instant case, for the third time before a circuit court, for a determination
of its meaning. The Sixth Circuit, in the case of Musselman Hub-Brake
0
Co. v. Commissioner,
allowed the deduction where a corporation made
a demand negotiable note to its creditor within two and one half months
after the corporation's taxable year. The creditor included the amount
in his gross income for the year of receipt of the note (the year after
the corporation's deduction). 7 The issue arose again in the Fifth Circuit
in the case of P. G. Lake Inc. v. Commissioner,8 where the corporation's
deduction of an interest expense incurred in 1939 was disallowed. Interest
1. H. R. Doc. No. 337, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 16 (1937).
2. H. R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1937).
3. "If, at the close of the taxable year of the taxpayer or at any time within two
and one-half months thereafter, both the taxpayer and the person to whom payment is
to be made are persons between whom losses would be disallowed under section 24(b)."
4. "If, by reason of the method of accounting of the person to whom the payment
is to be made, the amount thereof is not, unless paid, includible in the gross income of
such person for the taxable year in which or with which the taxable year of the taxpayer ends. ..

."

5. "If such expenses or interest are not paid within the taxable year or within
two and one-half months after the close thereof...
6. 139 F. 2d 65 (C. C. A. 6th 1943).
7. This fact appears in the opinion of the Tax Court, P-H 1942 TC MES-S DEC.
SERv. 1f42,593 (1942). The Musselnan result was reached by a rather devious method.
The court reasoned that a "constructive payment" was made by the corporation within
the two and one-half month grace period, since there was a "constructive receipt" by
the controlling shareholder within the grace period. It is settled that if there is a "constructive receipt" by the creditor within the taxable year, the deduction by the corporation is allowable, as the condition of § 24(c) (2) is not present, e. g., Michael
Flynn Manufacturing Co., 3 T. C. 932 (1944). But "constructive payment" is not a
necessary corollary to "constructive receipt." In fact this is rarely the case. See
Jenkins v. Bitgood, 101 F. 2d 17 (C. C. A. 2d 1939).
8. 148 F. 2d 898 (C. C. A. 5th 1945).
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was not payable to the creditor until 1940. While the interest was included in the creditor's 1940 tax return, the note was not given to the
creditor until after the two and one-half month period.9 The three decisions are reconcilable insofar as serving the purposes of § 24 (c). In the
instant case, the inclusion of the creditor's salary in his return for the year
of the corporation's deduction in itself negatives avoidance. As for the
Musselman case, had the corporation paid cash to the creditor within two
and one-half months after the year of the deduction, the deduction would
have been allowed, though the creditor would have included the amount in
his return for the year after the deduction. Therefore, there would have
been little reason to disallow the deduction on the Musselman facts, as
the government's position is no more disadvantageous where notes are
given. However, inclusion of the amount by the creditor in his gross income could not have been considered an operative fact in the Lake case,
since the manual transfer of the note which is to be considered the "payment," did not occur until after the two and one-half month grace period.
Had the deductions in the instant case and the Musselman case not been
allowed, an injustice would have resulted, for if disallowed, no deductions would be permitted in subsequent years when cash payment was received by the creditor in exchange for the notes previously given.10
However, courts might well guard -against extracting a principle from
these cases to the effect that giving a demand negotiable note is for all
purposes "payment" within the meaning of § 24 (c). If such a principle
is accepted, § 24 (c) might well become a nullity.

Income Taxation-Surrender of Notes and Judgment Claims to
Controlled Corporation in Exchange for Stock Constitutes a Transfer
of Property-Petitioners owned notes of a debtor corporation in the
amount of $270,000 and obtained judgment thereon. To satisfy the judgment, stock was issued in direct proportion to the amount of the notes
owned by each petitioner. After issuance of the additional shares, petitioners owned 82%o of the corporate stock. The Tax Court reversed the
Commissioner's finding that receipt of the stock gave rise to a taxable gain,
holding that the transaction constituted a transfer of property within
§ 112 (b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code,' so that no gain or. loss to
the petitioners could be recognized. Alexander E. Duncan v. Commissioner, CCH TAx CT. REP. (RFG.) Dec. 16027 (1947).
In enacting § 112 (b) (5) it was the intent of Congress not to disregard gain or loss completely, but to defer its determination and taxation
until the taxpayer had made final disposition of the stock received from the
controlled corporation. 2 In interpreting this section, the courts frequently
9. This fact appears in the opinion of the Tax Court, 4 T. C. 1, 2 (1944).
10. U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, § 24.6 (1938).

1. "Transfer to Corporation Controlled by Transferor No gain or loss shall be

recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely
in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation, and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control of the corporation; but in the case of an
exchange by two or more persons this paragraph shall apply only if amount of the
stock and securities received by each is substantially in proportion to his interest in
the property prior to the exchange."

§ 112(h) defines "control" as the ownership of

at least 80 per cent of the voting stock and all other stock.
2. H. R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921) ; SEN. REP. No. 275, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921) ; MAGIML, TAxABLE INcomE 149 (2d ed. 1945).
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have lost sight of the legislative intent and have reached conflicting decisions, resulting largely from the varied constructions placed upon the
phrase "if property is transferred." The property transferred may be
"real, personal, or mixed." 3 Difficulty of construction arises when it consists of a chose in action against the debtor corporation. For some purposes,4 the satisfaction of a promissory note is not considered an exchange
of property since there is "no acquisition of property by the debtor, no
transfer of property to him." 5 In interpreting § 112 (b) (5), however,
the Board of Tax Appeals has held that a transfer of claims against a
debtor corporation in exchange for stock constitutes a transfer of property
by the creditors within the meaning of the act." Later cases have not
adhered to this interpretation.

In Helvering v.

Cement Investors, Inc.7

the assets of a debtor corporation in bankruptcy were transferred to a new
corporation which assumed the obligations of the old company and issued
common stock to creditors in exchange for their bonds in the bankrupt
organization. The Supreme Court refused to find that the transfer of
bonds by the creditors to the new corporation was a transfer within the
meaning of § 112 (b) (5),8 yet held that since the creditors had an equitable
interest in the assets which the debtor transferred to the new corporation,
the transaction fell within the statute. Subsequent decisions, involving
similar factual situations, have narrowed the application of the section still
further, indicating that unless the creditor asserts his right of full priority
by resorting to legal action, he will not be held to have any equity in the
9
assets transferred by the debtor corporation to the new organization, and
§ 112 (b) (5) will not apply. These cases distinguish the Cement Investors case on the grounds that when bankruptcy proceedings were initiated, the creditors thereby acquired an equitable interest in the transferred
10
The distinction
assets, thus bringing the transaction within the statute.
is a tenuous one.
In holding that the relinquishment by the petitioners of the notes and
judgment claims constituted a transfer of property, the Tax Court in the
principal case thus accords a broader interpretation to § 112 (b) (5). In
contrast to recent decisions, no attempt is made to predicate the holding
on whether or not the creditors had reduced their notes to judgment. This
3. The corresponding provision of the 1921 Act, § 202(c) (3), stated, "any property, real, personal or mixed." Note also that U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, § 572(c) (1931)
states, "if property, real, personal or mixed, is transferred.
4. Specifically, the settlement of a promissory note for less than its face value has
been held not to be a sale entitling the taxpayer to a capital loss. Hale v. Helvering,
85 F. 2d 819 (App. D. C. 1936) ; accord, Bingham v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 105 F. 2d 971 (C. *C. A. 2d 1939); cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Spreckels, 120 F. 2d 517 (C. C. A. 9th 1941).
5. Hale v. Helvering, supra note 4, at 821.
6. Rockford Brick & Tile Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 31 B.
T. A. 537 (1934) ; accord, George P. Skouras v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
45 B. T. A. 1024 (1941) ; Miller & Paine v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 42 B.
T. A. 586 (1940).
7. 316 U. S. 527 (1942).
8. But cf. I. T. 2071, 111-2 Cum. BULL. 34 (1924).
9. Seiberling Rubber Co., 6 CCH TAx CT. CURRNT Dzc. 26,308 (1947) ; Bunker
Hill and Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
1 T. C. 1057 (1943).
10. Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, supra note 9, at 1076, quoted with approval in Seiberling Rubber
Co., supra note 9, at 26,314.
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would seem to be more in line with the intent and purpose of the act. Hale
v. Helvering 11 is distinguished as presenting a different problem 12 from
that contemplated in § 112 (b) (5). This distinction seems quite logical
since to allow the Hale case to govern would have the effect of requiring
immediate determination of taxable loss or gain in transactions in which
Congress intended to defer such determination until final disposition by
the taxpayer of his property. Inasmuch as such gain or loss must ultimately be recognized, there appears to be no particular policy argument in
favor of restricting the application of the section.

Labor Law-Designation by N. L. IL B. of Unit Appropriate for
Collective Bargaining Under Taft-Hartley Act-A union petitioned to
have 17 loopers, seamers, and examiners in a hosiery mill certified as a
collective bargaining unit, excluding the other production workers, 35
knitters. Its claim was based on the functional difference between the
proposed unit and the knitters, and also on the fact that union organization
extended only to the former. Except for a previous unsuccessful attempt
by the union to organize on an over-all basis, there was no history of collective bargaining in the plant. The Board found the proposed unit clearly
distinguishable from the knitters, but noted also certain sharp distinctions
among seamers, loopers, and examiners,' and also noted that these were
not' recognized crafts. The Board dismissed the petition on the employers' motion, reasoning that in view of the smallness of the plant and
the lack of homogeneity in the proposed unit, the petition could only have
been granted on extent of organization alone, which would have conflicted with § 9 (c) (5) LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT.2 Delaware
Knitting Co., Inc., 75 NLRB No. 27 (1947).
Inter-union conflicts have provided the Board with many difficult
problems in determining whether craft unit, plant unit, or subdvision thereof
is appropriate. 3 Although each case is decided on an ad hoc basis, the
Board has developed a technique of balancing various factors, such as:
history of collective bargaining in the plant; desires of employees; or the
functional arrangement of employees. 4 Where but one union was involved,
the Board's policy from the beginning was to certify a group of employees who wished representation and who constituted an appropriate
unit, thus allowing immediate collective bargaining, rather than awaiting
the organization of a broader and possibly more appropriate unit.5 This
policy greatly facilitated union organization since selection of the union
as bargaining agent normally led to perfection of the broader unit. Opponents of the policy cited the danger of union gerrymandering,0 but the
11. 85 F. 2d 819 (App. D. C. 1936).
12. See note 4 supra.
1. Although all worked under one supervisor, there were skill differentiations, and
examiners, in contrast to the others, were not machine operators.
2. ". . . extent to which employees have organized shall not be controlling." 61
STAT. - (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 (Supp. June, 1947), amending NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS AcT, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159 (1940).
3. The Board was charged with so determining by both N. L. R. A. § 9(b), 49
STAT. 453 (1937), 29 U. S. C. § 159(b) (1940) ; and L. M. R. A. § 9(b), 61 STAT. (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159(b) (Supp. June, 1947).

4.

NINTH ANNUAL REPORT, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD 33-34.

5. SEVENTH ANNUAL RE ORT, N. L. R. B. 60; East Texas Motor Freight Lines,
55 NLRB 967 (1944).
6. See dissenting opinion, Garden State Hosiery Co., 74 NLRB No. 52 (1947).
It is the present writer's opinion that the word gerrymandering implies manipulation
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Board often protested that it never found a unit appropriate on the basis
of extent of organization alone.7 Thus § 9 (c) (5) in forbidding extent
of organization as the controlling factor would seem to be declaratory of
previous practice, and only mandatory in that extension of the former
policy is forbidden.
Since the Board has previously endorsed a policy of fision in regard
to similar small plants,8 the principal peg of the instant decision seems to
be lack of homogeneity in the proposed unit. However, the Board has
often certified multi-craft units 9 and, upon occasion, functional units comprising differing skills and jobs, even where extent of organization was
not a factor. 10 Even more striking is the fact that only where competing
unions have been involved, 1 or where the proposed unit was not distinguishable from the rest of the employees, 12 has the Board dismissed a
petition on the ground that the smaller unit desired was lacking in homogeneity. The balancing of factors in the principal case which leads the
Board to reliance upon § 9 (c) (5) seems, therefore, to reflect a new
policy,'8 possibly motivated by hints, in the legislative history of the new
Act, of Congressional dissatisfaction with the Board's use of the extent

of organization principle.' 4 If this policy is continued, it will deprive one

device for speeding union organization of much of its effectiveness.
It would seem that Congress in passing the Taft-Hartley Act did not
intend to restrict orderly unionization and bargaining processes, but only
to prevent certain abuses. 15 Piecemeal unionization would not appear to
be such an abuse in itself. Trouble is only caused when jurisdictional conflicts or coercive unionization methods result. This decision unquestionably

denies employees an early opportunity to bargain collectively, and this result is not in harmony with the basic principles of the new Act as asserted

in § 1.16

of election districts to the detriment of one of two or more opposing parties. Thus,
although the problem of bargaining unit designation is essentially one of determining
an election district, there is really no gerrymandering problem where only one union
is involved.
7. See majority opinion, Garden Street Hosiery Co., supra note 6. Note also that
extent of organization would always be the controlling factor if the problem was which
of two units was the only appropriate one. Actually this factor only comes into action
where two units are appropriate, but one may be more so.
8. Garden Street Hosiery Co., supra note 6, and companion cases; Forest Knitting
Co., 69 NLRB 89 (1946) (knitters only, certified as unit).
9. NINTH ANNUAL REPoRT, N. L. R. B. 33; see, e. g., Wrought Iron Range Co., 75
NLRB -

(1947).

10. E. g., Hercules Powder Co., 64 NLRB 700, 707 (1945) (crane operators and
boiler firemen lumped together because they were fringe groups). Often helpers or
apprentices are lumped in with journeymen and even masters.
11. Great Lakes Engineering Works, 3 NLRB 825 (1937) ; 0. E. Kearns & Son,
Inc., 72 NLRB 153 (1947).
12. Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 60 NLRB 1343 (1945) ; 0. E. Kearns & Son, Inc.,
supra note 11.
13. This conclusion is buttressed since the Board here passes over the fact that
seamers, loopers, and examiners operated under one supervisor (see note 1 supra).
This fact has often been given weight in previous decisions.
14. H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1947).
15. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1947); L. M. R. A. § 1, 61
STAT. -, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. June, 1947). While L. M. R. A. § 7, 61 STAT.
-, 29 U. S. C. A. § 157 (Supp. June, 1947), insures to employees the "right" to refrain from concerted activities and infringement of this "right" by coercive means is
declared to be an unfair labor practice in L. M. R. A. § 8(b) (1), 61 STAT. -, 29 U.
S. C. A. § 158(b) (1) (Supp. June, 1947)., L. M. R. A. § 1 supra, still announces the
encouragement of collective bargaining as the national policy.
16. See note 15 supra.
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Liens-Effect of the New Pennsylvania Judgment Lien Law on
Terre-Tenants-The new Judgment Lien Law 1 is a restatement, in
less ambiguous language, of those provisions and decisions which have
proven just and workable throughout the years. It provides, inter alia,
that a revival of a judgment lien is not effective against land conveyed to a
terre-tenant 2 unless he is made a party to the agreement or scife facias,
but if he is not so joined, the creditor may revive the lien as to the terretenant, either by agreement or scire facias, within five years of the recording of his deed and it then continues only so long as it continues against
the debtor.
Judgment lien law in Pennsylvania had its inception in 1798,3 but the
practice of "constructive" revivals arising under this act made necessary
further legislation in 1827. 4 In addition, the Act of 1827 provided for
revival by agreement of creditor, debtor and terre-tenant.5 In Armstrong's
Appeal," this provision was interpreted to mean that revival by agreement
must include the terre-tenant even though his deed was not recorded. Thus,
the desirable aim that matters be settled amicably was defeated, and it
became necessary for the creditor to obtain a scire facias for adequate protection from the fraud or negligence of the terre-tenant. The Act of 1849
remedied this situation by providing that revival against the debtor bound
the terre-tenant who had not recorded his deed or gone into actual possession. 7 The Act of 1827 was re-enacted in toto in 1887 8 with the additional requirement that the terre-tenant be named in the original scire
facias. Construed literally, this would have repealed the Act of 1849, but
in Uhler v. Moses,0 the court held that such was not the intent of the
legislature.' 0 A series of conflicting decisions gradually expanded the in1. Act of July 3, 1947, Act 504, PA. STAT. ANN., tit.
12, § 877 to § 884 (Purdon,
Supp. 1947).
2. Generally, a terre-tenant is one who becomes the owner of an interest in real
property after a lien has attached. Havens v. Pearsons, 334 Pa. 570, 574, 6 A. 2d 84,
87 (1939). However, § 3(d) of this act limits the term to those persons who have
made their acquisition of the property a matter of record.
3. Act of April 4, 1798, 3 Sm. L. 331, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 864 (Purdon,
1931). This act provided that liens were to be limited to five years unless within that
time they were revived. Previously, acts had been passed in 1700, Pa. Laws, 1 Dallas
12, and 1705, Pa. Laws, 1 Dallas 67, authorizing the sale of real estate to satisfy a
judgment but establishing no time limit on such liens.
4. Act of March 26, 1827, P. L. 129, PA.STAT. ANN., tit 12, § 868 (Purdon, 1931).
Its purpose was to restrain the practices which had crept in under the Act of 1798,
"of constructive revivals of judgments by the issuing of execution, or by stay of execution, or of dispensing with revivals because the money was payable in futuro, or on a
condition or contingency attached to a confession of judgment." Armstrong's Appeal,
5 W. & S.352, 354 (1843).
5. "Another and most material object of the Act of 1827 was to regulate revivals
by agreement of the parties, concerning which nothing had been said in the Act of
1798, but which had become a common usage." Id. at 355. The only mode of revival
mentioned in the Act of 1798 was by use of scire facias.
6. Supra, note 4.
7. "In all cases when a judgment has been or shall be regularly revived between
the original parties, the period of five years, during which the lien of the judgment
continues, shall only commence to run in favor of the terre-tenant from the time that
he or she has placed their deed on record: Provided, that this act shall not apply to
any cases which have been finally adjudicated, or when the terre-tenant is in actual
possession of the land bound by such judgment, by himself or a tenant." Act of April
16, 1849, P. L. 663, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 872 (Purdon, 1931).
8. Act of June 1, 1887, P. L. 289, PA.STAT. ANN., tit.
12, § 868 (Purdon, 1931).
9.200 Pa.498, 50 Atl. 231 (1901).
10. The court stated that ithad become common practice to issue a scire facias
against the judgment debtor and direct the sheriff to give notice to all terre-tenants
without designating them by name and it was at this evil that the Act of 1887 was
aimed. Id. at 503.
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of3
terpretation of these statutes " and culminated 2in 1942 in the decisions
v. Krach 1
the Superior Court in Simmons v. Simmons 1 and Ellinger
which held that the recording of the deed by the terre-tenant automatically
revived the lien on that property for five years although the creditor never
thereafter revived against the judgment debtor. Thus, the careless or
fraudulent terre-tenant was protected from the equally careless creditor,
was punished for his scruples. The
but the conscientious terre-tenant
14
Legislaturd acted immediately, but in view of the resulting defects the
5
While this act answered the problem of the
haste was unfortunate.'
Simmons and Ellinger cases, it restored the indefinite lien against the
6
The Legislature again
debtor. and revived the evils of the 1827 Act.'
realized its errors and the present act resulted from its desire to abolish
them and provide a workable and fair lien law.
The 1947 Act adequately protects the diligent creditor from the fraud
or negligence of the debtor or third parties, but unfortunately does not give
the terre-tenant the same degree of consideration. There is no sound
reason for allowing the creditor five years from the date of recording to
revive against the terre-tenant. A more equitable rule would require the
creditor, on reviving against the debtor, to join the terre-tenant if at that
time his deed is recorded.17 In either case the creditor must search the
record and it is certainly no greater burden to do that prior to revival than
after. It is true that such a provision might work a hardship on the creditor where the deed is recorded immediately prior to revival but the difficulty could be avoided by providing that the lien will be continued against
property of a terre-tenant if his deed is recorded within ten days of revival
against the debtor. While the new act goes a long way toward solving
the lien law problem in Pennsylvania, this additional step might well be
taken.

Municipal Corporations-State May Not Delegate Power to
Create a Crime to Municipal Authorities-A Wisconsin statute made
drunken driving a misdemeanor subject to fine or imprisonment or both,
and authorized counties to pass ordinances in strict conformity with the
statute. The county of Winnebago brought an action against defendant
for violation of such an ordinance. On appeal by the state from a denial
of a writ of prohibition against an order directing a trial by jury, the
11. For an exhaustive review of these decisions see Klein v. Anderson, 39 D. & C.
139 (1940), but note that the court's attempt to synthesize them into a logical whole
results in a distorted interpretation of the Act of 1849.
12. 150 Pa. Super. 393, 28 A. 2d 445 (1942), 17 TEMP. L. Q. 99 (1942).
13. 150 Pa. Super. 384, 28 A. 2d 453 (1942). These two cases were joined and
affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court. 346 Pa. 52, 29 A. 2d 677 (1943), 91 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 568 (1943).

14. Act of May 28, 1943, P. L. 774, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 864.1, § 864.2 (Purdon, 1946). The Supreme Court decision was handed down on January 14, 1943, and
House Bill 501 was introduced on March 2, 1943.
15. For a trenchant criticism of this act see Amram, Lien and Revival of Judg-ments-A Serious Legislative Error, 15 PA. B. A. Q. 133 (1944). For a proposal in
accord with Amram's views see id. at 383.
16. Armstrong's Appeal, supra note 4.
17. This result would have been achieved under the Act of 1887 had the court
felt free to adopted the apppellant's contention in Farmers' National Bank and Trust
Co. v. Barrett, 321 Pa. 273, 275, 184 Atl. 128 (1936), that the Act of 1849 was modified by the Act of 1887, so that the five years do not run if at time of revival against
the debtor, the terre-tenant's deed is of record. Though believed reasonable by the
court the argument was rejected because of Uhler v. Moses, supra note 9.
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statute was held unconstitutional I as an' attempt to confer sovereignty
insofar as it authorized county authorities to create a crime.2 State ex rel
Keefe v. Schiniege, 28 N. W. 2d 345 (Wis. 1947).
Municipalities, 3 by the great weight of authority, can provide by ordinance for punishment of an act already covered by statute, 4 and prosecution by one governmental unit is no bar to prosecution by the other.5 Some
courts hold that the ordinance must be consistent with the statute; 6
others invalidate the ordinance only if the statute expressly prohibits ordinances on the same subject.7 But the rule seems to be almost universal
that where there is express authority from the legislature to the local
unit, the latter may prohibit by ordinance that which is already made penal
by statute.8
If the prohibited act is not only contrary to the peace and good order
of the state but also contrary to the peace of the municipality, as an entity,
the local unit should be able to punish the wrong to it, 9 especially if
authorized by the legislature. Whether or not the prohibited act is labeled
"misdemeanor" by the statute and therefore "crime" by the court 10 should
not affect the decision. Such a view was accepted in People v. Hanrahan,"
where authority for the Michigan legislature to delegate to counties the
power to create a crime and impose imprisonment therefor was found in a
constitutional provision substantially the same as the one in the instant
1. Wis. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 22 provides, "The legislature may confer upon the
boards of supervisors of the several counties of the state such powers of a local, legislative and administrative character as they shall from time to time prescribe." The
court said the statute authorized creation of a crime, and creating a crime is not local,
legislative and administrative.
2. The enforcement of an ordinance by fine is generally regarded as a civil action
to recover a forfeiture, and imprisonment for failure to pay the fine as a proper way to
enforce payment. McLaughlin v. Nebraska, 123 Neb. 861, 244 N. W. 799 (1932). In
this comment, "imprisonment" is used to mean imprisonment per se, e. g., imprisonment or imprisonment and fine, and not as an enforcement of a fine. In the instant
case, the Wisconsin court reasoned: imprisonment per se is involuntary servitude; involuntary servitude is prohibited by the constitution unless as a penalty for crime;
therefore, if imprisonment per se is the sanction, a prohibited act must be a crime.
Thus the statute authorizing the ordinance to impose such imprisonment was delegating
authority to create a crime.
3. "Municipalities," "counties," and "local government units" are used interchangeably for purposes of this comment.
4. Instant case at 349; Hack v. Mineral Point, 203 Wis. 215, 233 N. W. 82
(1931); Commonwealth v. Goodnow, 117 Mass. 114 (1875) ; People ex rel. Fennell
v. Bay City, 36 Mich. 186 (1877) ; State (Riley) v. Trenton, 51 N. J. Law 498, 18 Atl.
116 (1889). See also 3 MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL COPPORATIONs § 924 and n. 15 (2d
ed. 1943).
5. Blatchly v. Moser, 15 Wend. 215 (N. Y. 1830); Malouf v. Roanoke, 177 Va.
846, 13 S. E. 2d 319 (1941); Wisconsin v. Hamley, 137 Wis. 458, 119 N. W. 114
(1909). See also Bisixop, STATUTORY CRIMEs 22 (3d ed. 1901) ; 3 McQuLLEN, mrpra
note 4, § 934.
6. Duluth v. Evans, 158 Minn. 450, 197 N. W. 737 (1924) ; Bodkin v. State, 132
Neb. 535, 272 N. W. 547 (1937). See also BABBITT, MOTOR VEHICLE LAW 241 (4th
ed. 1933).
7. Eddelman v. City of Brazil, 201 Ind. 84, 166 N. E. 1 (1929) ; New York v.
Bedell, 251 N. Y. 415. 167 N. E. 519 (1929).
8. Baraboo v. Dwyer, 166 Wis. 372, 165 N. W. 297 (1917) (counties may enact
ordinances "in strict conformity" with the statute) ; see Note, 147 A. L. R. 566 (1943).
See also Thrower v. Atlanta, 124 Ga. 1, 52 S. E. 76 (1905).
9. Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405, 14 S. E. 564 (1891) ; see Howe v. Treasurer
of Plainfield, 37 N. J. Law 145, 151 (1874). But cf. Helmer v. Superior Court, 48
Cal. App. 140, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920) (where the constitution provided the ordinance
would be superior to the statute if valid).
10. The instant court attached great importance to the word "misdemeanor," saying, at 348, "A misdemeanor is a crime."
11. 75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W. 1124 (1889).
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case.' 2 Moreover, many ordinances making a local misdemeanor of an act
already a statutory crime have been upheld when pursuant to express legislative authority, 13 even where the penalty included imprisonment,' 4 and in at
least four states where the offense was drunken driving 5 . By its decision
that the creation of a crime is undelegable, the Wisconsin court restricts
the municipality to fines by virtue of a rather restricted concept of the constitutional provision for delegation of powers. The danger of an invasion
of sovereignty does not seem too real in view of the express authority
necessary for a municipal ordinance, especially where, as in the instant
case, the ordinance must be in strict conformity with the legislative
authority.

Naturalization-Marital Relations Within Prohibited Degree of
Consanguinity Not Conclusive of Immorality-In 1943, Francioso filed
a petition for naturalization in which he disclosed that he had married his
niece in Connecticut in 1925 by posing as her cousin. They had become
acquainted upon his immigration two years previously, when he was

eighteen and she seventeen.

Subsequently, with approval of the bishop

who had full knowledge of their kinship, the marriage was solemnized in
the Catholic Church. With their four children they have lived in New
York in apparent concord. The Naturalization Service objected, in view
of statutes of both Connecticut' and New York 2 which declare such
marriages void as incestuous and provide penal sanction, that petitioner
had not met the naturalization requirement of "good moral character." 3
Affirming his admission to citizenship, the court ruled that the permanence
and stability of the marital relationship outweighed its illegality as evidence of his moral fiber. United States v. Franciosa,164 F. 2d 163 (C. C.
A. 2d 1947).
The decision follows a recent trend in judicial determination of "good
moral character" toward investigating impelling motives, and applying the
standard of moral sentiment of the community rather than statutory and
judge-made rules. 4 The way was opened for this decision by Petitions of
12. "The legislature may confer upon . . . the board of supervisors of the several counties such powers of a local, legislative and administrative character as they
may deem proper." MIcH. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 38 (1850). See note 1 supra.
13. Minnesota v. Hughes, 182 Minn. 144, 233 N. W. 874 (1930) ; Chapman v.
Selover, 225 N. Y. 417, 122 N. E. 206 (1919).
14. Littlejohn v. Stells, 123 Ga. 427, 51 S. E. 390 (1905) ; Polinsky v. New York,
73 N. Y. 65 (1878).
15. Minnesota-State v. Weeks, 216 Minn. 279, 12 N. W. 2d 493 (1943) ; UtahSalt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 97, 85 P. 2d 802 (1938), aff'd on rehearing,97 Utah
113, 93 P. 2d 671 (1939) ; Virginia-Shawv. Norfolk, 167 Va. 346, 189 S. E. 335 (1937) ;
West Virginia-State ex rel. Burkett v. Robinson, 96 W. Va. 556, 123 S. E. 575
(1924) (by implication). No cases were found in which ordinances making drunken
driving a misdemeanor subject to imprisonment were held invalid where express
authority was given by the state.
1. GEN. STAT. OF CONN., § 5262, 6381, Revision of 1918; §§ 5148, 6229, Revision
of 1930.
2. NEW YORK DomEsTic RELATiONS LAW § 5; NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 1110.
3. 54 STAT. 1142, 8 U. S. C. § 707(a) (3) (1940).
4. Compare It re Schlau, 136 F. 2d 480 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), wvith In re Spiegel,
24 F. 2d 605 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) ; U. S. v. Rubia, 110 F. 2d 92 (C. C. A. 5th 1940).
The trend is probably best illustrated by a series of cases turning on the good faith
of petitioner, and culminating in Petition of Smith, 71 F. Supp. 968 (D. N. J. 1947).
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Rudder 5 where, in the court's opinion, adulterous relationships of similar
longevity, faithfulness, and apparent respectability failed to offend the community's sense of decency, rendering petitioners morally acceptable, although cognizant of their violation of the law. That the parties eventually
legalized their status was indicative of proper motives, and finds a parallel
in the religious ceremony of the instant case. Fundamentally the problem
resolves itself into a determination of the depravity of the crime in relation
to the degree of atonement in subsequent exemplary behavior, to the
rectifying effect of which courts occasionally subscribe. 6 Embracing the
principles of "natural law" with regard to incestuous marriages, the common law regarded marriage of uncle and niece as within the bounds of
decency and this has been the attitude of many American jurisdictions
until comparatively recent legislation. 7 That such marriages, if valid
where contracted, have been accorded recognition in jurisdictions declaring them incestuous,8 or have been held merely voidable, 9 or have been
permitted by some religions with legislative approval,1 0 are strong indications that the sanctity of well-established marriages is of more force
than the statutory disapproval of unions within this particular degree of
consanguinity. On analysis, the cases reveal such legislation to be based
on public abhorrence of the domestic licentiousness of which such unions
are usually indicative, and the necessity of preventing the resultant degradation and possible disruption of the family, in whose welfare the state
has a primary interest."1 Fear of the vicious propensities of inbreeding
has been a minor though largely unwarranted influence. 12 The immorality
of petitioner's marriage at its inception is therefore highly questionable in
view of the similarity of ages, lack of previous family contact, and the
special dispensation granted by his religion. 13 Remaining faithful to
his family during the probationary period was the least morally reprehensible resolution of the dilemma. His development of a family relationship
of the type highly regarded by the state is indicative of his capacity for
5. 159 F. 2d 695 (C. C. A. 2d 1947). One of the four situations arising in this
case offers an interesting possibility of an argument applicable to the instant case. In
spite of a statutory impediment to marriage, the court declared that such a longstanding relationship was tantamount to a common law marriage, and therefore morally
acceptable. Since the civil and religious ceremonies of the instant case are legally
void because of the statutory impediment, the same reasoning might prevail here.
6. In re Balestrieri, 59 F. Supp. 181 (N. D. Calif. 1945) (1st degree murder) ;
Petition of Gabin, 60 F. Supp. 750 (N. D. Calif. 1945) (Denied for failure to atone) ;
In re Bookschnis, 61 F. Supp. 751 (D.Ore. 1945). For an indication that the instant
court subscribes to this line of thought, see dictum in an even more recent decision,
Repouille v. United States, 16 U. S. L. WEEK 2288 (C. C. A. 2d Dec. 5, 1947). See
also Fields, Conflicts in NaturalizationDecisions, 10 TEMP. L. Q. 272, 283-289 (1936).
7. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y. 1820); Fensterwald v. Burk,
129 Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358 (1916). Some states continued to permit such marriage as
late as 1886. 1 SmfsoN, AMERICAN STATUTE LAW § 6111.
8. Petition of Lieberman, 50 F. Supp. 121 (E. D. N. Y. 1943). See REPORT OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL (N. Y. 1933). Contra: U. S. ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, 109 Fed.
886 (E. D. Pa. 1901).
9. Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa. 309 (1863) ; Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468 (1863);
Bowers v. Bowers, 10 Rich. Eq. 551 (S.C. 1858).
10. Petition of Lieberman, supra note 8; Fensterwald v. Burk, supra note 7.
11. Campbell v. Crampton, 2 Fed. 417 (N. D. N. Y. 1880) ; and cases cited, supra,
notes 7, 8, 9. See also Note, Consanguineous Marriages-A Scientific Approach, 15
ST. Louis L. REv. 175 (1930).
12. Incuria v. Incuria, 155 N. Y. Misc. 755 (N. Y. City Ct. 1935) ; Schofield v.
Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564 (1912). Eugenical results are analyzed by Arner, Con-

sanguineous Marriages in the American Population, in 31 COLUmBIA UNIV. STUDIES
IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PuBLIc LAW 345-441 (1908).
13. In the eyes of the community, petitioner's marriage probably appears comparable to a union of first cousins which is permissible in many jurisdictions.
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worthy and beneficial citizenship, and would therefore seem sufficient to
atone for his innoxious violation of the law.
It may be supposed that the court's failure to reflect on petitioner's
liability to prosecution 14 rests in the conviction that a would-be prosecutor
would recognize that the circumstances render punishment of this type
of individual a miscarriage of justice tending to the detriment of the community, in that Francioso's imprisonment would leave his family destitute
as public charges. The extreme unlikelihood of an ensuing relaxation of
moral standards has influenced the court to adopt a sensibly flexible approach in determining the worth of the individual.

Securities and Exchange Commission-Trading by Management
in Securities of the Corporation During Reorganization-In December 1943 a registered holding company filed with the SEC, under § 11 (e)
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,1 a plan for the retirement of the company's senior securities. In March, 1944, the Commission approved the plan except for payment to the officers and directors
of the company for securities acquired by them during the period when
reorganization plans were being considered. Pending reargument and the
disposition by the Supreme Court of the Chenery case,' the Commission
ordered the money covering these securities held in a special fund.3 The
management transactions here, however, unlike those of the Chenery case,
were not part of a concerted purchasing program; nor did they create
prospects of acquiring post-reorganization voting control or involve any
considerable profit. The solvency of the company, furthermore, gave the
management little choice of alternative reorganization plans. The Commission, therefore, declining to make findings as to whether actual unfair
dealings were present, found that the plan did not create such possibilities
of abuse on the part of the management that their participation should be
restricted to the cost of their securities plus interest, and the fund was
released. Cities Service 4Co., SEC Public Utility Holding Co. Act Release
No. 7720, Oct. 1, 1947.
The instant case, although factually distinguishable from the Chenery
case, rests on the same legal basis; the Commission's conclusions as to the
fairness of the reorganization plans are based, in both cases, not on findings
as to abuse by management, but on findings as to the degree of possibility
of such abuse. 5 The Commission's unwillingness to determine whether
actual abuse was present in the Chenery case 6 at first led it to adopt a
14. See U. S. ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, supra note 8, for a case where the court
considered this aspect controlling in a deportation proceeding.
1. 49 STAT. 822 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79k(e) (1940). This section requires the
Commission to find the plan "fair and equitable" to the persons affected by it before
approving it.
2. Federal Water Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5584, Feb.
8, 1945. This denial by the Commission of equal participation in reorganization was
sustained by the Supreme Court sub norn. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1575
(1947).
3. Cities Service Co., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4944, March 15, 1944.
4. For another case very similar to the instant case, see American States Utilities
Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7721, Oct. 3, 1947.
5. See concurring opinion, instant case at 21.
6. Fed. Water Service Corp., 8 S. E. C. 893, 919 (1941).
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prophylactic rule denying equal participation to securities traded in by any
management during reorganization periods. Such a rule avoided the necessity for a determination, since, absent a finding of actual abuse, a general
prohibition obviated what would amount to an exercise of arbitrary discretion in allowing trading by one management and denying it to another
when both might alike be innocent (or guilty) of abuse. 7 After that case
was remanded by the Supreme Court 8 the Commission abandoned its general prohibition 9 and, although it still professed to be unable to make a
determination as to the existence of abuse, 10 it nevertheless still denied the
management's securities equal participation." This ruling was sustained
by the Supreme Court.' 2 The instant case is thus an exercise by the Commission of discretionary powers approved by the Supreme Court and exercised, in the spirit of the Holding Company Act, to protect public investors
from the abuse by management of the extraordinary powers possessed during reorganization.
In the light of the Supreme Court's admonition that restraint should
be exercised in ad hoc proceedings,13 a rule which will eliminate the temptation to profit and afford reorganization managers a basis for determination
of the limits of permissible trading would seem desirable. Normally the
linkage of ownership with control is thought to provide incentive to efficient management; 14 but during reorganization the opportunity for substantial personal gain, resulting from extraordinary power lodged in the
officers and directors ir and submergence of the restraints by which other
shareholders normally restrict their activities, undermines the validity of
this supposition. Nevertheless, a blanket prohibition of all trading by
7. Before the SEC ruling, the sort of trading done by the management was in no
way unlawful or prohibited. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 93 (1943). The
new rule was applied flatly in Derby Gas & Elec. Corp., 9 S. E. C. 686, 707-11 (1941).
8. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943), reversing, 128 F. 2d 303 (App.
D. C. 1942). The court of appeals held that the SEC had no power to promulgate
a rule decisionally. But cf. FTC v. Keppel, 291 U. S. 304, 314 (1934) ; American
Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 106 (1946). The Supreme Court disagreed and
held merely that the equity precedents relied on to justify the rule were inapplicable
and suggested in their stead the Commission's expertness in corporate matters.
9. Fed. Water Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5584, Feb. 8,
1945, p. 32 and n. 31.
10. Id. at 27-29. for an indication that the Commission had perhaps actually
found abuse, see Fed. Water Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 4957,
April 18, 1944, for which Release No. 5584, supra note 9, was substituted.
11. Fed. Water Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5584, Feb. 8,
1945.
12. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1575 (1947), reversing, 154 F. 2d 6 (App.
D. C. 1946). Dissent by Jackson and Frankfurter, JJ., appears in 92 L. Ed. 1 (1947).
Vinson, C. J., and Douglas, J., took no part in the decision; Burton, J., concurred in
the result merely; the opinion therefore represents the views of a minority of the full
court. The majority opinion considered the SEC's power of decisional rule-making
(see note 8 supra) and the propriety of the rule; the SEC, however, no longer purported to make a rule (see note 9 upra), but relied on an exercise of its discretion in
the face of a possibility of abuse.
13. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1575, 1580 (1947).
14. The majority of jurisdictions consider director-stockholder transactions as
mere arms-length bargaining. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIvATE CORPORATIONs § 1168 (Perm. ed. 1931). The minority require that a director before purchase from a stockholder of his corporation must voluntarily disclose any material
facts affecting the value of the shares which he knows because of his position. Oliver
v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903). An intermediate view requires duty of
disclosure only where special circumstances exist. Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419

(1909).

15. For a comprehensive analysis of this extraordinary control and corresponding
specific opportunities for misuse, see the Commission's opinion in Fed. Water Service
Corp., supra, note 2, at 21.
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management during reorganization would, in effect, freeze individual holdings over an extended period, possibly causing personal hardship and resentment.16 In contrast to the voluntary position of trustees in bankruptcy
and protective committees,17 public utility holding company officers and
directors are compelled to assume the burden of reorganization. Consequently, a prohibition of trading, assented to in the first instance, would
be more in the nature of a penalty in the latter. In the principal case, the
absence of those disturbing features the cumulative effect of which in the
Chenery case created a conflict of interest detrimental to the investing
public, convinced the Commission that a prohibition of incidental trading
under the instant circumstances was unwarranted. Certainly, however,
inadequate protection of the investing public would result from adoption
of the concurring opinion. That opinion advocates imposition of sanction
in the absence of a definite rule only where concurrent existence of the
pernicious elements renders inescapable the inference of acute conflict of
interest. The public investor will be reassured by the majority's policy

announcement that, discounting reasonable profit unquestionably accruing
from individual appraisal of market conditions, the presence of any of the
discordant factors will incur the Commission's censure.' s

Selective Service-Meaning of "Minister" Within the Act as
Applied to Jehovah's Witnesses-Defendant, a member of Jehovah's
Witnesses, was classified as a conscientious objector by his local draft
.board despite his contention that he was a minister within the meaning
of the Selective Service Act which exempts "regular or duly ordained
ministers of religion." I The Regulations define a regular minister as
"a man who customarily preaches . . . the principles . . . of a recognized . . . religious sect . . . who is recognized by such . . . sect
. . . as a minister." 2 Jehovah's Witnesses claim exemption from all
service, military or civilian, on the ground that all are ministers of religion.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, the defendant reported to a
civilian public service camp which he immediately left without permisson,
intentionally remaining away. The defendant was convicted for this violation of the Act. 3 On trial, the court refused to direct a verdict of not
guilty if the jury should find that the local board had erroneously classi16. Permitting officers and directors to dispose of their holdings during the period,
which may be as long as four to eight years, would obviate this objection while offering much less opportunity for profit-taking, inasmuch as the most danger to investors
lies in purposeful depreciation of the market value to obtain securities at deflated
prices. Fed. Water Service Corp., supra, note 2, at 25.
17. Trustees are appointed by the court and have always been regarded by the
common law as prohibited from personal dealings with the trust property. Protective
committees, on the other hand, although usually acting under contract with the express
consent of the shareholders or bondholders, have only recently been recognized by
the courts as fiduciaries in the nature of trustees and subject to the same restrictions. SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORx, AcTIviTiEs,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COmmITTEES, pt.
VIII, 221-231 (1940).
18. Instant case at 16. ". . . we believe that this opinion should serve to apprise management of companies subject to the Act that we regard any trading on their
part . . . as potentially dangerous to the reorganization process, and that . .
we will feel much freer in the future to resolve borderline cases against the persons
suggest (sic) in such trading activities. . ....
1. 54

STAT.

887, 50 U. S. C. App. § 305(d) (1940).
(selective service).
894, 50 U. S. C. App. § 311 (1940).

2. 32 CODE FED. REGS. 622.44 (Supp. 1941)

3. 54

STAT.

1948]

RECENT CASES

fled him. The Supreme Court (four judges dissenting) affirmed his conviction, holding (1) that the trial court may submit the issue of improper
classification to the jury only if the court determines that there was no
basis in fact for the board's classification, and (2) that the evidence that
the defendant devoted only a small portion of his time to preaching was
sufficient to support the board's determination. Cox v. United States, 68
Sup. Ct. 115 (1947).
Once again the Supreme Court has been faced with a problem which
raises the basic issue of the conflict between man's duty to his conscience
and to his state. 4 Once again the substantive question has not been reached
because of an excursion into legalistic concepts which effectively cut off
the human issues involved. 5 Is the determinative test of whether a man
is a minister within the meaning of the Act to be based on the amount
of time devoted to his preaching? Or does the ultimate decision rest
with his position in the eyes of the members of his faith? It is questionable whether Congress, in passing the Act, specifically considered the
religious views of this small, unorthodox sect. The terms of the statute
itself are not conclusive. The word "customarily" is susceptible of more
than one logical interpretation." To say that the time factor is of primary
import is to deny equal treatment under the statute to dissentient and
unpopular groups which are often unable to support their ministers financially and whose ministers, therefore, must engage in secular work in addition to their religious duties. 7
But the fact that Jehovah's Witnesses claim total exemption from
service may well have influenced the majority in reaching its decision. 8
To grant such an exemption here, since the defendants were not "leaders"
of their faith in the sense in which the term is ordinarily used, would mean,
in effect, that there could be a blanket exemption of all the available men
in this particular faith. Such an interpretation of the Act would appear
to be unwarranted, particularly in light of the fact Congress was asked to
grant complete exemption to "absolutists" 9 when considering the 1940
Act, but refused so to do. 10 Because of the "blanket-exemption" possibility,
therefore, the result may be justified. But if the "time-devoted" principle
enunciated by the Court"1 is to be applied to future cases where the question of ministerial exemptions arises, it may well lead to the undesirable result of compulsory service on the part of ministers who were intended to be
exempt under the Act.
4. E. g., W. Va. State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943)
(refusal to salute the flag) ; Girouard v. U. S., 328 U. S. 61 (1946) (willingness to
agree to bear arms as a condition for naturalization).

5. See Hamilton, Book Review, 56 YALE L. J. 1458 (1947).
6. It may be held to mean "habitual" (which would favor the minority view in
the instant case) or "continuous" (which would support the contention of the majority
of the court).
7. Many clergymen of the Southern Baptist Convention are of this type, as are
those of the Mennonite sect and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).
8. While Jehovah's Witnesses base their refusal to serve on this ground, it actually
appears to be based on their loyalty to the "Theocracy," and their citizenship in a
heavenly organization. They contend that they are neutral in the conflicts of worldly
governments. See Elliff, The Prosecution of Conscientious Objectors Under the

Selective Service Act, 6 FED. B. J. 41, 44 (1944-45).
9. An absolutist is generally defined as one who objects to all conscripted service,
military or civilian.

10. Hearings Before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 10132, 76th Cong.,

3d Sess. 191, 206, 457 (1940) ; Hearings Before Committee on Military Affairs on
Sen. 4164, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 164, 309 (1940).
11. The question of the total exemption of all Jehovah's Witnesses was not brought
before the Court which restricted itself to the evidence passed on by the local board.
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Torts-Duty of Employer to Warn of Disability and Refrain
From Requiring Hard Work of Disabled Employee-Plaintiff, unaware that he had a "bad" heart, applied to defendant Iron Works for a
job. Company doctors gave him a physical examination which disclosed
the heart disease. Thereafter, without having been warned of his serious
condition, plaintiff was put to work as helper in the maintenance department. Three months later he left the Iron Works with his disability
decidedly aggravated by hard manual labor. A demurrer by the Iron
Works to a complaint alleging the foregoing facts was overruled. The
Supreme Judicial Court sustained a bill of exceptions, holding that unless
an employer has knowledge that the employee is ignorant of his condil
tion there is no duty (1) to warn the employee of his disability, and (2)
to refrain from requiring hard labor. In the absence of an allegation of
such "knowledge," the complaint was defective.1 Glidden v. Bath Iron
Works Corporation,54 A. 2d 528 (Me. 1947) .2
Jurisprudential pre-occupation with the more violent forms of misbehavior permitted, historically, the development of a dogma that in the
absence of some special relation, there is no liability for "non-feasance,"
i. e., an omission to act. 3 Under certain circumstances, the master-servant
relationship falls into the exception to the rule. Thus, in a hazardous industry, 4 or an isolated place,5 a master is under a duty to provide medical
care for an injured employee. Indeed, an employer is obligated to rescue
an endangered servant," even though that servant has been antecedently
negligent. 7 Justification for the imposition of these duties is founded on
the rationale that the relation is of some potential economic benefit to the
employer, and the expected benefit justifies the requirement of special obligations.8 This rationale is equally applicable to impose a duty on the
1. Workmen's Compensation Acts usually provide that if the accident comes
within the purview of the act, recourse by the employee to a common law action against
the

employer is precluded. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 90 (3d ed.
1941). The same result has been reached by decisions. See Note, Workmen's Coin-

pensation Act-Bar of Common Law Recovery for Non-Compensible Injuries, 14 N.
C. L. REv. 199 (1936). But common law suits against employer are still widespread.
HOROvITz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 317 (1944) ;
SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra, § 90. The question of whether the Maine Workmen's Compensation Act would bar this action was not raised. See Patrick v. J.B. Ham Co.,
119 Me. 510, 519, 111 AtI. 912, 915 (1921).

2. By way of dictum the court stated, on a point not alleged but argued by counsel
for plaintiff, that a master does not owe a duty to refrain from hiring a person seeking

employment if there is knowledge that he is unfit for the job he wishes to perform.
Instant case at 530.
3. Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 P. 281 (1903) ; Osterlind v.
Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N. E. 301 (1928) ; RESTATEIENT, TORTS § 314 (1934). Contra:

Faggs Adm'r. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 111 Ky. 30, 63 S.W. 580 (1901).
4. Troutman's Adm'r. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 179 Ky. 145, 200 S.W. 488
(1918) ; Huniche v. Meremac Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172 S. W. 43 (1914) ; RE-

§ 512(2) (1932). Contra: Voorhees v. N. Y. C. R. R., 129 App.
Div. 780, 114 N. Y. Supp. 242 (4th Dep't 1909).
5. Carey v. Davis, 190 Iowa 720, 180 N. W. 889 (1921) ; Hyatt v. Hannibal &
St. Joseph R. R., 19 Mo. App. 287 (1885) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 512(2) (1932).
6. Raash v. Elite Laundry Co., 98 Minn. 357, 108 N. W. 477 (1906) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 512(1) (1932).
7. Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co., 112 F. 2d 163 (C. C. A. 3d 1940) ; Harris
STATEMENT, AGENCY

v. Pa. R. R. Co., 50 F. 2d 866 (C. C. A. 4th 1931), noted in 16
(1932), 30 MICH. L. REv. 479 (1932).
8. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 192 (1941).

MINN.
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Compare Szata v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
132 N. J. L. 331, 333, 40 A. 2d 562, 563 (1945) :"This precept [duty to give employee

medical aid] probably had its inception in the code of moral conduct . . . but has
become a legal duty. . ...
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master to warn his servant of the disability.9 On the other hand, the duty
to refrain from requiring hard manual labor is encompassed within the
concept that one may not aggravate the position of a person in peril. 10
It is obvious that an employee, as here, would be in a worse condition,
physically, by employment in a capacity incompatible with an infirmity
unknown to himself.-" Should both of these bases for liability be brushed
blandly aside for want of the employer's actual knowledge that the employee was ignorant of his condition? Is it not socially desirable to place
an affirmative duty on the master to determine whether an employee knows
of his peril? Concededly, imposition of a duty to refrain from requiring
hard work is open to a compelling objection. Even though an employer
has given the employee a task which the employer in good faith considered
to be commensurate with the employee's physical capacity, an over-zealous
jury might well find, with the benefit of hindsight, that further injury could
have been forseeable. However, if the employee has been warned, the
assumption of risk defense would be available. Creation of the duties
sought would, of course, be not only compensatory but preventative. Safety
in industry should not be jeopardized by such conceptual niceties as
knowledge of the employee's ignorance of his disability. An employer confronted with the possibility of a tort judgment 12 might well hesitate before
sending a potential hazard into his plant.13 While Workmen's Compensation Acts have gone far in the elimination
of industrial accidents,' 4 an
5
added incentive should not be overlooked.'
Trade Regulation-Elimination of Competition Between Merging
Corporations and § 1 of the Sherman Act-On June 19, 1946, the War
Assets Administration sold to the United States Steel Corporation the
government-owned plant at Geneva, Utah.' After the sale, the management of U. S. Steel, having decided that sound business policy required
9. See also Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability,
PA. L. REv. 217, 316, 334 (1908) : "There is, however, a distinct tendency in
the cases where the relation of master and servant exists towards the more humane
view of the maritime law. ..
'
10. Yazoo & M. R. R. Co. v. Leflar, 168 Miss. 255, 150 So. 220 (1933) ; Depue
v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N. W. 1 (1907). A possible third ground for liability
could be the implied representation by the employer that, by giving the employee a job
as a laborer, the servant is physically fit for the employment. See, e. g., Erie Railroad
Co. v. Stewart, 40 F. 2d 855 (C. C. A. 6th 1930) ; O'Leary v. Erie Railroad Co., 169
N. Y. 289, 62 N. E. 346 (1901).
11. Apparently an employer is under no duty to have a prospective employee
physically examined. But cf. Warren Vehicle Stock Co. v. Siggs, 91 Ark. 102, 105,
120 S. W. 412, 414 (1909). Should an employer be penalized for not utilizing the
findings of a medical examination where he did more than he was required to do?
This question is answered affirmatively by the following: Gates v. Chesapeake & Ohio
R. R. Co., 185 Ky. 24, 213 S. W. 564 (1919) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 323 (1934).
12. The employee who recovers a judgment at common law is usually well compensated. HORovrTz, CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 474, n. 20
(1947).
13. An employer is under a common law duty to provide competent fellow-servants.
Baird v. New York Central R. R., 64 ApD. Div. 14. 71 N. Y. Supp. 734 (1901);
Brown v. Levy, 108 Ky. 163, 55 S. W. 1079 (1900). See 1 BAILEy, MASTER AND
SERVANT 882 (2d ed. 1912).
14. Sabel, The Uncompensated Industrial Injury, 36 Micia. L. REv. 935, 944
(1938). The downward trend is probably due to the merit rating system used by
insurance companies to reduce insurance premiums. See DODD, ADmINISTRATIoN OF
WORKcmEN'S COMPENSATION 711 (1936).
15. DODD, op. cit. supra note 14, at 710: ".
. . safety becomes tangible to business men only when it is reduced to financial terms.'"
1. As required by § 20 of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 58 STAT. 775 (1944),
50 U. S. C. App. § 1629 (Supp. 1945), the Attorney General approved the proposed
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securing an adequate backlog for the operation of its newly-acquired plant
by obtaining fabricating facilities in the West Coast area,2 contracted,
through a subsidiary,3 for the purchase of the physical assets and good
will of the Consolidated Steel Corp., a California corporation, and its
subsidiaries. Thereupon the Department of Justice sued to enjoin performance of the contract.4' It alleged a threatened violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act 5 by the elimination in the "Consolidated market" 6 of the
competition existing between the merging corporations in the sale of
fabricated steel products and by the elimination of competition between
U. S. Steel and others in the sale of rolled steel products to Consolidated.
The three U. S. Steel defendants 7 were further alleged to have violated
both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by an attempt to monopolize the
production and sale of fabricated steel products. The District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that the competition eliminated was not
substantial 8 and that the evidence showed neither an intent to monopolize
nor the degree of market control necessary to constitute a monopoly.
United States v. Colunbia Steel Co., '44-'47 CCH TRADE REG. SERV.

1157639 (D. C. Del. 1947).9
The purpose of Congress in passing the Sherman Act was to secure
to the public the benefits believed to flow from a freely competitive economic system.' 0 It sought to accomplish this purpose by creating in the
Federal courts the power to enforce in interstate commerce the common law rules against restraint of trade and monopoly."
Divergent
views as to what was the common law in this field, however, created confusion,1 2 and courts today are faced with an array of conflicting dicta and
cases difficult of reconciliation. Especially is this true of the problems
raised by industrial mergers. :3 Twenty years after the passage of the
act the introduction of the "rule of reason" ' 4 made lawful under § 1 of
sale before acceptance of U. S. Steel's bid, 14 U. S. L. WEEK 2768 (1946). He relied
on a dictum of L. Hand, J., in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d
416, 424 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), to the effect that it was doubtful whether 60 to 64%
market control would constitute a monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act and that
certainly 33% would not. Acquisition of the plant raised U. S. Steel's percentage of
national capacity from 31.4% to 32.7% and gave it 39% of the Far West capacity.
2. Rolled steel products produced at Geneva are the raw materials used for structural and plate fabrication.
3. Columbia Steel Co., a Delaware corporation.
4. On March 19, 1947, the Department of Justice announced the formation of a
merger unit within the Antitrust Division to scrutinize all corporate mergers in relation to the antitrust laws and, where possible, advise business men as to the legality of
proposed mergers. Department of Justice Press Release, March 19, 1947, reported in
CCH TRADE REG. SERV. (9th ed.) 1 54126 (1947).
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
6. An area including 11 western and southwestern states. The Sherman Act has
application to any portion of the United States as distinguished from its application to
industries on a national basis. Farmers Guide Co. v. Praire Co., 293 U. S. 268 (1934).
7. Joined with defendant Columbia Steel Co. were U. S. Steel Corp. of Delaware,
a corporation rendering technical assistance to all the U. S. Steel subsidiaries, and the
parent corporation, U. S. Steel Corp., a N. J. corporation.
8. In structural fabricating the court considered only bids actually submitted by
the two companies for the same jobs as competitive, finding that these represented 2%
of all bids "made by one or both."
9. Probable jurisdiction noted by the Supreme Court, Dec. 22, 1947.
10. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 434 (1940); see United States v.
Aluminum Co., supra note 1, at 426, 428-29.
11. HAMILTON AND TILL, ANTITRUST IN

ACTION 8-10 (TNEC Monograph 16,

1940).
12. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FED-

ERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 4-8 (TNEC Monograph- 38, 1941).

13. Id. at 74 et seq.

14. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60 (1910).
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the act, some contracts which put an end to existing competition: 15
those where the elimination was reasonable, i. e., where the eliminated
competition was not substantial. Despite some conflict in the cases, this
principle appears to apply to the elimination by a merger of the competition
previously existing between merging companies.' 0 Substantiality of the
competition has usually been determined by the proportion of the competitive business of the two companies to their non-competitive business. 17
The courts have stressed also the competitive situation in the industry
generally after completion of the merger.' 8
But the method used to compute the substantiality of the competition
eliminated by the merger in the instant case is open to question. The
court broke down steel fabricating into structural and plate fabricating
and considered the two as wholly different businesses. The ohly competition found to exist in plate fabricating was in the manufacture of piping
and this the court eliminated by a further differentiation based on a
difference in size and method of production.' 9 In structural fabricating
the court considered competitive only that business of the two corporations represented by attempts to secure the same jobs from the same
customers, i. e., bids actually submitted in competition. Such a method,
however, fails to take into account potential competition and its great
effect20 in determining the price policy of partial or even complete monopolists.
In relation to any job for which both companies were merely
physically able to compete, neither company could prudently quote a
price without considering the possibility that the other might also submit a bid. It would seem therefore that the competition exising between
two companies engaged in a "made-to-order" type production, as opposed
to a repetitive production-line type, might more adequately be measured
by a comparison of facilities for production rather than of competing bids.2 '
Re-examined from this viewpoint ard in the light of the recognized social
policy in favor of "small business," 22 the facts of the case might possibly
have led the court to a different conclusion.
15. See United States v. Aluminum Co., .pra note 1, at 427.
16. United States v. Standard Oil of N. J., 47 F. 2d 288 (E. D. Mo. 1931);
United States v. E. I. Du Pont Co., 273 Fed. 869 (D. C. Del. 1921). But cf. United
States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214 (1922) ; United States v. Reading Co.,
253 U. S. 26 (1920). Railroad cases, which appear to forbid the elimination of competition despite the reasonableness of such competition have been explained on the
basis that railroads are, in effect, legislatively established monopolies and the granting

of competing franchises amounts to a declaration of policy in favor of such competition. Private parties are therefore not free to eliminate it to any extent. Kales, Good
Section 7 of the Clayton Act
and Bad Trusts, 30 HARv. L. REv. 830, 832 (1917).
prohibits the acquisition of the stock of one corporation by another "where the effect of
such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation
."
38
whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition.
STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. 18 (1940).
17. International Shoe Co. v. F. T. C., 280 U. S. 291 (1929) (5% competitive held
not substantial) ; Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. F. T. C., 65 F 2d 336 (C.
C. A. 2nd 1933) (59% competitive held substantial), rev'd on other grounds, 291 U. S.
587 (1929). The standard under the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act is the same.
See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 121 (N. D. Ohio 1935).
18. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., supra note 17, at 120, 124; United
States v. Standard Oil of N. J., 47 F. 2d 288, 309-10 (E. D. Mo. 1931) ; United States
v. E. I. Du Pont Co., 273 Fed. 869, 875 (D. C. Del. 1921).
19. See CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 7-9 and Ch.
IV (1938).
20. See United States v. Aluminum Co., supra note 1, at 426.
21. The findings and opinion give little assistance, revealing merely that Consolidated and U. S. Steel together had 22.1% of the total bookings of the industry in the
Consolidated market during the period from 1937 to 1942. (Finding No. 22.)
22. See United States v. Aluminum Co., supra note 1, at 428-29.

